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Abstract
The OECD in its BEPS action plan 4 addresses tax base erosion by prot shift-
ing through the use of tax deductible interest payments. Their main concern is
interest deductions between outbound and inbound investment by groups. Studies of
multinational rms show that the tax sensitivity of debt is more modest than what
one would expect given the incentives for prot shifting. The purpose of this pa-
per is to review existing literature and to add new knowledge on multinational rm
behavior that pertains to the use of debt.
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1. Introduction
A common feature of national tax systems is that interest expenses related to debt are
tax deductible whereas the opportunity cost of equity is not. This property is often
referred to as the debt tax shield in the literature, and it gives rmsa preference for
debt nancing over equity. In an open economy with multinational rms, an additional
incentive in favor of debt arises. If the corporate tax rate in the parents home country is
lower than the tax rate faced by its foreign subsidiary, the parent rm has an incentive to
charge its subsidiary a high interest rate on intra-rm loans in order to shift prot back
to the parent.1 Even for a given xed interest rate, the multinational rm can save tax
by shifting debt to the high-taxed a¢ liate, since the tax savings from interest deductions
in the high-tax country exceed the tax obligation in the parent rm. These incentives
imply that a¢ liates facing high tax rates should have relatively high debt-to-asset ratios
and excessive interest deductions compared to their peer group.
It is well known that the debt tax shield is a key driver of both domestic and multi-
national companiescapital structure. Feld et al. (2013) in a meta study accounting for
potential misspecication, nd that the debt-to-asset ratio increases by 2.7 percentage
points if the marginal tax rate increases by 10 percentage points. They also nd that
there are signicant di¤erences in capital structure choice between multinationals and
domestic rms.2 The purpose of this paper is to examine the tax sensitivity of debt in
multinationals in particular.
A number of studies have investigated the tax sensitivity of debt in multinationals.
Desai et al. (2004) use data on US multinationals and nd that a 10% increase in the
corporate tax rate is associated with a 2.8% increase in the debt-to-asset ratio of a¢ liates
of multinationals. In their study, the use of internal debt across a¢ liates is not taken
into account whereas they do account for loans between a parent rm and an a¢ liate.
Huizinga et al. (2008) model the optimal allocation of external debt and nd that
ignoring international debt shifting as part of the rms leverage decision understates the
impact of national taxes on debt policies by about 25%. Egger et al. (2010) examine debt
shifting by internal debt and nd that multinationals have a signicantly higher debt-to-
asset ratio than national rms, and that this di¤erence is larger in high-tax countries.
The studies above either omit internal debt or only account for external debt. Hence,
they underestimate the tax sensitivity of debt. Møen et al. (2011) uses micro-level
data on all German multinationals. They nd that the tax sensitivity of debt has been
underestimated in the studies above. Using a hypothetical case where a multinational
group consists of two a¢ liates of equal size, they nd that if the a¢ liate located in the
country with the highest tax rate experiences a 10 percentage points tax increase, the
debt-to-asset ratio will fall by 1.4 percentage points in the low-tax country, and increase
by 4.6 percentage points in the high-tax country. For a company with an average debt-to-
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asset ratio at the outset, a 4.6 percentage points increase in the debt-to-asset ratio implies
a 7.4% increase in debt. About 40% of the increase in debt is due to the tax induced
advantage of debt from which both national and multinational rms benet, while about
60% is due to international debt shifting. They also nd that in the case of international
debt shifting, internal and external debt is of about equal importance.
Arena and Roper (2010) nd that di¤erences across countries in tax factors a¤ect
where multinationals locate debt, and that multinationals di¤er in how sensitiv they are
to taxes. Both rm size and the type of industry seems to matter. Møen et al. (2011)
nd evidence for that debt in large multinationals is more tax sensitiv than in smaller
rms. One reason may be that it is costly to engage in tax planning and that larger rms
have more nancial muscle.
The studies above point to the tax sensitivity of debt being quite moderate in multi-
nationals given the tax incentives. One explanation may be that existing theory needs
to be rened, another that new evidence for incentives to hold debt have not yet been
tested. The purpose of this paper is to review existing literature and add new knowledge
on multinational rm behavior that pertains to the use of debt. The studies mentioned
above are just a small fraction of a large literature on the tax sensitivity of debt. This
paper now proceeds to survey the empirical literature on the tax impact on corporate
debt nancing.
2. Meta Studies
It follows from theory that the debt tax shield implies that leverage should increase
when the e¤ective tax rate goes up. A central denition in the literature is the marginal
tax e¤ect on the debt ratio. It measures the percentage point change of the debt ratio
in response to a one percentage point change in the tax rate. Researchers use various
measures to model the tax rate. Some use the statutory corporate tax rate, whilst others
use an average tax rate calculated as taxes paid divided by pre-tax income. The latter
measure is meant to capture that some rms do not need to use debt to reduce the tax
burden since their tax position is exhausted due to loss-carry forwards and other non-debt
tax shields. Given the di¤erent measures of tax rate, it is perhaps not surprising that
the identied magnitude of the marginal tax e¤ect varies greatly across studies and that
some even nd a downward bias in the estimated debt response to tax.
Feld et al. (2013) synthesize the evidence from 48 previous studies in a meta -
regression that not only shows the statistically central tendency in the literature, but
also explains the determinants of variation in di¤erent studies. One of their main nd-
ings is that the rened simulated marginal tax rate suggested by Graham (1996, 1999)
avoids the downward bias in the estimated debt response to debt. When they account
for all possible misspecication biases, Feld et al. (2013) predict a positive marginal tax
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e¤ect on the debt ratio of 0.27. This number spans both domestic and multinational
rms
A¢ liates of multinationals may be engaged in prot shifting by excessive interest
deductions whereas the prot shifting motive is absent in national (domestic) rms. There
is therefore a strong theoretical argument for expecting a more positive tax impact on
leverage in multinational rms (see, e.g. Altshuler and Grubert 2003). Feld et al. (2013)
separate their sample into domestic and multinational rms and nd that tax e¤ects on
debt are more pronounced in multinationals if primary estimates refer to average tax rates
rather than statutory tax rates. Average tax rates capture cross country di¤erences and
should therefore be better indicator of the tax incentives related to debt in multinationals.
When splitting the prot shifting e¤ect from the pure impact of the domestic tax
system, Feld et al. (2013) nd that a rising host country tax rate exerts a marginal
e¤ect on debt-asset ratios of about 0.199, and that the prot shifting e¤ect arising from
di¤erences in tax rates adds a marginal tax e¤ect of about 0.140. Taken together, the
numbers imply that if the host country tax rate rises by one percentage point, the debt
ratio increases by 0.339 (= 0.199 + 0.140).
Feld et al. (2013) also nd that time e¤ects are more pronounced for multinational
rms. One explanation may be that multinationals can use internal debt (through -
nancial operation centers) and that they may have better access to credit markets. Con-
sequently, their responsiveness to macroeconomic trends might also be larger than in
domestic rms.
One would expect that the tax sensitivity of debt should depend on the maturity of
debt. Typically rms hold more long term than short term debt. Feld et al. (2013), how-
ever, nd that marginal tax e¤ects are una¤ected by the maturity of debt. However, the
inclusion of control variables such as rm prot, ination, and industry specic leverage
raises reported tax e¤ects on debt.
It is also reasonable to expect that di¤erences in systems for avoiding double tax-
ation across countries would a¤ect the tax sensitivity of debt. Some countries exempt
dividends paid to corporate shareholders from taxation whereas other countries use the
credit system. Under the latter, foreign taxes paid can be credited against the domestic
tax liability that falls on repatriated dividends. Feld et al. (2013) investigate whether the
corporate debt policy di¤er between multinationals headquartered in exemption or credit
countries. They do not nd evidence for that tax e¤ects di¤er across di¤erent systems of
international taxation.
3. Costs and Benets of Debt
A parent loan to an a¢ liate is often referred to as internal debt as opposed to external
debt, which is a loan from a nancial institution. Internal and external debt carry di¤erent
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costs and benets. In the literature, internal debt is often regarded as equivalent to equity,
since such debt is generally subordinated to all other kinds of debt and does not represent
a bankruptcy risk.
Research on debt and the nancial structure of rms can be divided into two groups;
theories that examine rms in a closed economy and studies that examine multinational
behavior. The factors that a¤ect the cost of using debt for domestic rms also matter
for multinationals. Other factors pertain to multinationals only. These range from tax
saving incentives in a global context to the need to control risk and achieve an overall
tax-e¢ cient capital structure. The various incentives are discussed separately below.
3.1. Trade-o¤ Theory
Theories of optimal capital structure often explain companieschoice of debt versus equity
by a trade-o¤, where rms weigh the benets of debt against the costs. The use of external
and internal debt leads to di¤erent types of benets and costs for an a¢ liate.3 Although
internal debt holds many of the same properties as equity, it is, in contrast to equity, tax
deductible.4 However, the use of internal debt is costly due to various tax engineering
expenses incurred in order to avoid or relax regulations such as thin capitalization rules
and/or controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules.5 Costs and benets of debt depend on
whether it is internal or external debt.
External debt can be benecial in reducing informational asymmetries between man-
agers and shareholders and in enforcing discipline on overspending managers (see Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Benets of debt are also related to the use of debt
as a device for managers to operate e¢ ciently (Meckling and Jensen, 1976), benets of
external monitoring of the rm (Jensen 1986), as well as the debt tax shield.
There are di¤erent types of cost related to external debt. Too much external debt
may induce a debt-overhang problem that causes local managers to miss good invest-
ment opportunities (Myers, 1977). Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) also point out that
the tax preferences given to debt may lead to excessive borrowing and a higher risk of
bankruptcy.6 Costs related to debt are bankruptcy costs (Warner, 1977 and Weiss, 1990),
personal taxes (Miller, 1977), asset substitution e¤ects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and
debt overhang that may restrict new borrowing (Myers, 1977). The trade-o¤ theory has
been tested in large number of papers and this literature has been surveyed by Frank and
Goyal (2009).7 Common for these studies are that they are done in a closed economy
setting.
The implication of the trade-o¤ theory for empirical studies is that there is not a
one-to-one relationship between taxes and debt. An increase in the tax rate may lead to
more debt from a tax saving perspective, but cost factors may mitigate the tax incentive.
For example, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate may not a¤ect debt if the
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rise in bankruptcy costs due to higher debt exceeds the tax gain. Non-tax factors, then,
dampen the tax incentive and are one reason why debt is less tax sensitive than the pure
tax e¤ects suggest.
3.2. The use of Internal Financial Centers
One insight from theory is that the multinational rm saves tax most e¢ ciently by struc-
turing its lending operations in a nancial center in a zero tax jurisdiction (Schindler and
Schjelderup, 2012). By using an internal bank in a tax haven type jurisdiction the rm
gets the full bene t of the debt tax shield in a high tax country whereas the tax oblig-
ations on interest income are zero. Such a set up maximizes the value of debt shifting.
Møen et al (2011) show that large multinationals use internal banks (so called nan-
cial coordination centers) to conduct such borrowing and lending. Smaller rms may be
restricted because there are substantial costs related to the use of tax experts and ac-
countants, and that a tax-e¢ cient structure world-wide may imply costly reorganization
of the rm. Such costs imply that only rms of a certain size can recapture these costs
through tax savings. Ruf (2011) argues that for such reasons the tax sensitivity of debt
is larger in big multinational enterprises than in smaller multinationals.
3.3. The use of Holding Companies
Many countries o¤er so called tax consolidation or group tax regimes. These rules imply
that a group of wholly owned or majority-owned companies is treated as a single entity
for tax purposes. The implication is that the head entity of the group is responsible for
all or most of the groups tax obligations. Many countries such as Germany, the UK,
the US and France have such rules. In this context, it is especially interesting to note
that most multinational expansion happens through acquisitions (over 90% of foreign
direct investment8). In an acquisition, the full deductibility of nancing costs is a crucial
element. Schumacher and Bahn (2005) explain how a German parent company can obtain
a deduction of nancing costs from the acquisition targets prots through a German
acquisition vehicle (holding company). After the rm has been acquired, the holding
company and the acquired rm are consolidated for corporate income tax purposes. This
allows for a deduction of the nancing costs of the acquisition company from the prots of
the target company. According to German rules, the parent also avoids an 5% add-back
on dividends paid by the target company.
Such rules make it more attractive to nance an acquisition by debt but they also
make debt more tax sensitive. One would however, expect that the higher the corporate
tax rate facing the parent rm is, the less likely it is that the parent rm will set up a
holding company as a debt planning tool (see Ruf, 2011).
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3.4. The Benets of Parental Lending.
Empirical studies show that a signicant amount of lending originate from the parent
rm. One reason for this is the combined e¤ect of external lending and parental lending.
Suppose that the parent rm is located in a low tax country, and that the tax di¤erential
between the parent and an a¢ liate gives the parent an incentive to charge a subsidiary
a high interest rate. In order to do so it can use external nancing. The interest rate on
external debt is determined by the market and the parent has an incentive to make the
a¢ liate look like a risky proposition so, that the market interest rate will be high even
for a small loan. By taking up a small loan at a high rate of interest, the parent can
use this interest rate as an arms length proxy for internal lending by the parent to the
a¢ liate.
A second tax incentive in favor of parental lending is that the market may view the
parent as less risky than an a¢ liate. If so, the parent rm can borrow at a lower rate
than its a¢ liates. This funding advantage makes it attractive to conduct lending from
the parent.
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) provide a number of reasons why the parent
rm is best suited as a lender. Following Grossman and Hart (1986), they see ownership
to imply residual control rights over the rms assets. In relation to internal debt, these
control rights are with the capital supplier or the parent rm, which ultimately provides
explicit and implicit credit guarantees for the debts of all of its a¢ liates. Giving control
rights to the parent rm rather than to any external credit supplier or subsidiary, has
some advantages. For example, since the parent rm is the ultimate claimant it has
stronger incentives to monitor. Moreover, when the parent rm has many a¢ liates, it
can, if one unit performs badly, redeploy assets more e¢ ciently than an external credit
provider can.
The benets pointed out above reduce the tax sensitivity of debt if the parent rm
is located in a high-tax country. If the parent rm is located in a low-tax country, one
would expect that the non-tax factors and the tax factors work in the same direction and
increase the tax sensitivity of debt.
3.5. Concealment costs
Nielsen et al. (2015) make the point that the observed low tax sensitivity of debt may
be because it is less costly for the rm to shift income by transfer prices on goods and
services than on debt. They argue that the multinational rm has greater discretion
in setting the price on intangible goods. Their analysis shows that concealment costs
related to transfer pricing a¤ect the concealment costs of debt shifting in a way that
reduces the tax sensitivity of debt, and that public regulation that pertains to leverage
may a¤ect the scope for transfer pricing (and vice versa). Thin capitalization rules,
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for instance, may make it relatively cheaper for the management to manipulate the
interest rate on intercompany loans. There may also be economies of scale and scope
related to tax planning that intertwine these decisions. For example, skills in concealing
abusive transfer-pricing practices may have positive spillover e¤ects on the rms ability
to disguise its real debt-to-asset ratio.
3.6. Parent Credit Guarantees.
Huizinga et al. (2008) study how di¤erences in national tax systems a¤ect the use of
external debt in multinational rms. They assume that the parent rm provides explicit
and implicit credit guarantees for the debts of all of its a¢ liates, and that a higher total
debt-to-asset ratio for the group increases the risk of bankruptcy. This leads them to
predict that multinational rms will balance external debt across a¢ liates by taking into
account the tax rate in all the countries where they are present. An increase in the tax
rate in one country will make it protable to use more debt in the a¢ liate located in this
country. More debt will, however, increase the risk of bankruptcy for the group. This
e¤ect is mitigated by lowering the use of debt in all other a¢ liates. By shifting external
debt this way, multinationals can exploit the debt tax shield more aggressively than
national rms while holding the overall risk of bankruptcy in check. For a multinational
rm with a¢ liates of equal size in two countries, a 10 % overall tax increase in one country
increases the debt-to-asset ratio in that country by 2.4 %, whilst the debt-to-asset ratio
in the other country falls by 0.6 %. These results are, however, based on variation in
total debt, as external debt cannot be isolated in the Amadeus database.
4. Government Regulation
Multinational companies can exploit the tax advantage of debt more aggressively than
national companies by shifting debt from a¢ liates in low-tax countries to a¢ liates in
high-tax countries. In doing so, they shift income to low tax jurisdictions through interest
deductions in high-tax countries. The value of prot shifting must, however, be balanced
against other well-known costs and benets that inuence the rms capital structure (as
detailed above).
Most countries use the rules laid out in the OECDModel convention (see OECD 1979)
to protect themselves against too much debt or too high interest rates. The model con-
vention states that, for inter-company loans, one must rely on the arms length principle.
This amounts to determining what a third party lender would agree on both the terms
of the loan and the interest it carries. If independent (domestic) rms would borrow less
than subsidiaries of a multinational, the multinational rm runs the risk that some of its
interest expenses are denied.
Government regulation may dampen the tax sensitivity of debt if such regulation is
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e¤ective. There are di¤erent approaches among countries to limit the amount of debt
on which deductible interest payments may be made. These rules usually apply but not
always (see below) to related party nance transactions. Traditionally countries that use
explicit rules to limit debt shifting by multinationals have fallen into two categories; safe
harbor rules and earnings stripping rules. I will discuss these in detail below. The next
sections provide a survey of controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and their impact on
debt.
4.1. Safe Harbor Rules (SH)
A safe harbor rule is a ratio rule that is meant to restrict the amount of debt for which
interest is tax deductible. The exact denitions of the debt measure in the numerator of
the ratio and of assets or equity in its denominator vary across countries, but the most
common rule is either to use a ratio based on total debt-to-equity or internal (corporate
group) debt-to-equity.
Büttner et al. (2008) and Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) study SH-rules
and nd that they decrease (intercompany) loans and increase equity. Interestingly,
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer (2008) nd no e¤ect on real investment stemming
from such rules, and argue that multinationals have various strategies to circumvent such
rules. One strategy they describe in detail is the use of holding company structures (see
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008, section 5 for the details).
Buettner et al. (2012) study foreign a¢ liates of German multinationals and nd
that thin capitalization rules e¤ectively reduce the incentive to use internal loans for tax
planning but result in higher external debt. Recently, Blouin et al. (2014) investigate
how thin capitalization rules worldwide a¤ect the capital structure of foreign a¢ liates of
US multinational rms. They nd that restrictions on an a¢ liates debt-to-assets ratio
reduce this ratio on average by 1.9%, while restrictions on an a¢ liates borrowing from
the parent-to-equity ratio reduce this ratio by 6.3%.
Taken together these studies nd evidence for that safe harbor rules have a substantial
e¤ect on the capital structure of multinational rms.
4.2. Earnings Stripping Rules (ES)
Earnings stripping rules impose a cap on interest deductibility. Unlike safe harbor rules,
they are commonly not restricted to intra-group or related party nance transactions
and so operate as a general restriction on interest deductibility. Earnings stripping rules
have emerged because of the perception that safe harbor rules can be avoided. Earnings
stripping rules operate to restrict interest deductions that exceed a certain threshold,
such as a percentage of EBITDA or EBIT.9
A handful of countries use both safe harbor rules and earnings stripping rules, either
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simultaneously or they impose a marginal earnings stripping requirement that applies
only if the safe harbor limit is exceeded. Although the number of countries using an
earnings stripping rule alone or in conjunction with a safe harbor rule is small, they
include signicant economies such as Denmark, Japan, Bulgaria, France, Norway and the
United States.
An interesting question given the di¤erent country approaches to limit the use of debt
is whether safe harbor rules are better at restricting the use of debt in multinationals than
earnings stripping rules. Gresik et al. (2015) show the policy, among all the combinations
observed in practice, which maximizes the host country national income is an earnings
stripping rule without a safe harbor rule. Multinationals can shift prot either by the
abusive interest rate (transfer price) or by internal debt. Prot shifting by debt allows
the rm to avoid the tax on the normal rate of return on mobile capital directly, whereas
an abusive transfer price is an indirect and more costly way of mitigating the tax wedge
both for the rm and society. An earnings stripping rule is more e¤ective at curbing
abusive transfer pricing and is therefore a better choice from a host country perspective.
4.3. Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) Rules
CFC regimes are used in many countries as a means to prevent erosion of the domestic tax
base and to discourage residents from shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions. CFC rules
di¤er from country to country, but they work to eliminate the deferral of income earned
by a CFC and tax residents currently on their proportionate share of a CFCs income.
Typical conditions CFC regimes are that a domestic taxpayer control the CFC rm;
that the CFC rm is located in a low taxjurisdiction or that the jurisdiction is listed as
a CFC country. CFC rules will in general make it less attractive to use debt to save tax,
and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) argue that German CFC rules are e¤ective in reducing
passive investments (i.e., setting up nancial centers) in low-tax jurisdictions outside the
EU. Benelux Countries such as Belgium have designed special tax systems for nancial
centers where the explicit aim is to fall outside the most common characteristics that
would make a nancial center applicable for CFC taxation. Under the Belgian system
that was in operation until 2012, for example, the tax base of nancial coordination
centers consists of business expenses minus wages and nancial costs, rather than prot.
Such features may explain why Ruf and Weichenrieder (2009) nd that a substantial
number of multinationals have their nancial centers in the Benelux countries (see also
Weichenrieder and Mintz, 2008).
For countries in the European Union, the EU courts ruling in the so called Cadbury-
Schweppes case may a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of CFC rules and other measures to reduce
the tax sensitivity of debt. The implication of this ruling seems to be that restrictive tax
rules are acceptable if they target wholly articial arrangements put in place to avoid
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national taxation.
4.4. Corporate Tax Reform
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Eq-
uity (ACE) have recently gained interest in European policy debates as a way of restruc-
turing corporate tax due to perceived losses in welfare that follows from current corporate
tax systems.
The ACE-tax system was recommended by the Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees et al.
(2011)) and among the features of this system is that companies can deduct an imputed
return on equity as well as interest on debt. The symmetric treatment of equity and debt
implies that an ACE-tax is a tax on economic rent, but the problem of thin capitalization
and prot shifting by multinationals is not solved unless a notional imputed rent is used
on all types of nancing (i.e. a so called "allowance for capital costs (ACC)" system). An
ACE-system even without an ACC variant achieves nancing neutrality and one would
therefore expect it to reduce the tax sensitivity of debt somewhat.
The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) originally described by the US
Department of the Treasury (1992) works so that interest payments are not tax deductible
at all. This means that the debt tax shield is eliminated and that the corporate tax is
turned into a source-based tax on the full return to capital. A CBIT-system would solve
the problem of excessive debt and eliminate prot shifting by debt in multinationals.
Policy makers, however, have hesitated to implement the CBIT-tax because of problems
related to heavily indebted rms, di¢ culties related to the integration of the corporate and
personal taxes, and the need for special tax rules for deposit-taking nancial institutions.
A third alternative for reform is the business enterprise income tax (BEIT) as proposed
by Kleinbard (2007). BEIT is a comprehensive and coordinated system for taxing time-
value-of-money returns, called the cost of capital allowance (COCA) system. Under
the COCA regime, a business enterprise would deduct each year a time-value-of-money
(interest) charge on all of the capital invested in its business, regardless of whether the
company was funded by debt or equity. This works much like an ACC tax with a notional
interest rate being applied.
Sørensen (2014) shows in a model extension of the widely used King-Fullerton and
Boadway-Bruce-Mintz method of estimating the impact of taxes on the cost of capital10
that thin capitalization rules and earnings stripping rules should apply to all companies.
He nds that the deadweight loss from the tax bias against equity nance is linked to the
rise in risk premiums generated by the tax bias in favour of debt. The risk premiums in
his model include not only compensation for uncertainty; they also compensate for the
costs of nancial distress and the agency costs incurred by investors as a consequence of
imperfect and asymmetric information.
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper has surveyed the most common factors known to a¤ect the rms choice of a
tax e¢ cient nancing structure. Firms can borrow from the nancial market (external
debt) and from related companies (internal debt). The two di¤erent types of debt carry
di¤erent costs and and benets that set multinational and national rms apart. Multi-
nationals have additional incentives to use debt by exploiting tax di¤erentials across
countries. This suggests that debt held by multinationals is more tax sensitive than debt
of local rms. For such reasons, one would expect a¢ liates of multinationals located in
high-tax jurisdictions to have relatively high debt-to-asset ratios and excessive interest
deductions compared to their peer group. There are also non-tax factors that a¤ect the
choice of leverage in multinationals and these may dampen or increase the incentive to
hold debt. In sum, these non-tax factors may explain why empirical studies nd that the
tax sensitivity of debt is rather moderate. In addition, abusive transfer prices on intra
rm transactions related to tangible and intangible goods and services may be an easier
way of shifting prots.
Notes
1Similar but opposite incentives arise if the parent rm faces a higher tax rate.
2I will discuss the study by Feld et al. (2013) in a separate section.
3See Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2010) for recent overviews on factors
a¤ecting the optimal capital structure.
4See Gertner et al. (1994) for a discussion on internal debt and how it relates to external
debt and equity. Chowdhry and Coval (1998, pp. 87f) and Stonehill and Stitzel (1969) argue
that internal debt should in fact be seen as tax-favored equity.
5For a more detailed discussion, see Mintz and Smart (2004) and Fuest and Hemmelgarn
(2005).
6The trade-o¤theory of balances bankruptcy costs with returns from the tax shield. See,
for instance, Graham (2000), who estimates a tax shield value (before personal taxes) close to
10 % of the value of the rm.
7Recent examples of research in this tradition are van Binsbergen et al. (2010) and Korteweg
(2010).
8See Ruf (2011).
9EBITDA= Earnings Before Interest, Tax, and Depreciation Allowances. EBIT = Earnings
Before Interest and Tax.
10See King and Fullerton (1984), Boadway, Bruce and Mintz (1984).
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